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THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE: TEXAS VERSION
Lennart V. Larson*
1. INTRODUCTION

T

HE world knows Texas as having a penchant for claiming the
"biggest," the "most numerous," or the "best" of a variety
of things. One hesitates to characterize the Texas substantial evidence rule by one of these superlatives. Perhaps it is sufficient to
say that the Texas rule is "different" and to appraise it after explanation.
A fundamental problem in administrative law is the extent to
which determinations of administrative agencies should be subject
to judicial review. The problem is one of allowing to the agencies
full and effective use of their discretionary, "expert" powers and
yet of affording judicial relief where erroneous or unwarranted
action is taken. Usually the statute establishing an agency will indicate the scope of judicial review to be exercised. But frequently
no provision for appeal is made, and the review will depend upon
the type of suit instituted by the person aggrieved. At one extreme
the review may be limited to questions of law on the record made
before the agency; at the other extreme the review may be a retrial of the facts and law of the case.
In the federal domain the "substantial evidence rule" has been
a familiar one, expressed in numerous statutes.1 Under it the circuit courts of appeal have reviewed the record for errors of law
and have accepted as "conclusive" administrative findings of fact
if supported by some substantial evidence. The evidence did not
have to meet technical requirements of competency, but it had to
*B.S., J.D., S.J.D.; Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; member of the
Texas, Michigan, New Mexico and Washington State Bars.
1 Some nineteen of these statutes are collected in Stason, "Substantial Evidence"
in Administrative Law, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1026 (1941). See, for example, 49 STAT. 449
(1935), 29 U.S.C. 1946 ed. § 160(f) (National Labor Relations Act).
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be more than a scintilla and had to have "rational probative
force."' Because the rule was thought to make an administrative
finding impregnable where supported by a page of testimony, even
though contrary evidence was overwhelming in quantity and quality, Sections 7(c) and 10 (e) were included in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.' These sections prescribed that administrative orders were to be sustained only if supported by substantial
evidence on the whole record. Thus, if evidence supporting a
material finding is rendered insubstantial by opposing evidence,
the reviewing court is authorized to reverse. 4
The Texas substantial evidence rule may be described, roughly,
as superimposing the federal substantial evidence rule (as modified by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act) upon a trial
de novo. Undoubtedly this sounds anomalous, an impression that
will not entirely disappear with the delineation of the rule in the
succeeding pages. In order to draw inferences as to how widespread the rule is in its application, certain recent cases will be
considered, and the many Texas statutes providing for appeals
from administrative agencies will be examined and compared. The
importance of the rule in its effect upon practice before administrative agencies can hardly be exaggerated.

2.

NATURE OF THE TEXAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE

A definitive statement of the Texas substantial evidence rule
has been made in recent years in three decisions of the Texas
Supreme Court. Questions still remain, but the broad outlines are
clear.
In Trapp v. Shell Oil Company5 the Railroad Commission
granted a permit to Trapp and others to drill a second oil well on
a 1.77-acre tract in East Texas. The permit issued, after hearing,
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197 (1938).
a60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 1946 ed. § 1001 et seq.
4 Universal Camera Corporation v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951); NLRB v. Pittsburgh S. S. Company, 340 U. S. 498 (1951).
5145 Tex. 323, 198 S. W. 2d 424 (1946). Chief Justice Alexander dissented.
2
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as an exception to Rule 37,6 promulgated by the Commission
under the oil and gas conservation statutes. Plaintiffs, adjoining
leaseholders, filed suit to cancel the permit. The district court
denied relief, but the court of civil appeals reversed and remanded. On re-trial the district court cancelled the permit, and
the civil appeals court affirmed. On further appeal the Texas
Supreme Court reversed and sustained the permit granted by the
Commission.
The main issue, causing difficulty and confusion in the courts
below, was the nature of the proceeding in the district court under
Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948), Article 6049c, Section 8:
"Any interested person affected by the conservation laws ... or by
any rule, regulation or order made.., by the Commission ... and
who may be dissatisfied therewith, shall have the right to file a suit
in a Court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County ... against the
Commission ... to test the validity of said laws, regulations or orders.
...In all such trials, the burden of proof shall be upon the party complaining of such laws, rule, regulation or order; and such laws, rule,
regulation or order so complained of shall be deemed prima facie
valid."

Justice Slatton, speaking for the court, addressed himself to
a clarification of the substantial evidence rule. Three earlier decisions7 were reviewed, and in so far as they were inconsistent,
the Gulf-Atlantic case' was accepted as stating correct doctrine.
6The pertinent portion of the Rule reads as follows:
"No well for oil or gas shall hereafter be drilled in said East Texas field nearer
than 660 feet to any other completed or drilling well on the same or adjacent
tract or farm; and no well shall be drilled in said field nearer than 330 feet to
any property line, lease line, or subdivision line; provided that the Commission
in order to prevent waste, or to prevent the cofifiscation of property will grant
exceptions to permit drilling within shorter distances than above prescribed whenever the Commission shall determine that such exceptions are necessary either
to prevent waste or to prevent the confiscation of property."
7 Marrs v. Railroad Commission, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S. W. 2d 941 (1944) ; Railroad
Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S. W. 2d 1022 (1942) (also known as
Trem Carr case); Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S. W.
2d 73 (1939).
8 Supra note 7.
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The latter case had emphasized the necessity for treating the Railroad Commission as the primary fact-finding agency and the
danger that uniformity of administration of the oil and gas conservation laws would be sacrificed if the district court were allowed
to substitute its findings of fact. The suit under Article 6049c,
Section 8, had been regarded as a special statutory action in which
the Commission's order should not be set aside unless it was
"illegal, unreasonable or arbitrary." So far as findings of fact
were concerned, the order was not illegal, unreasonable or arbitrary if it was "reasonably supported by substantial evidence."
Justice Slatton's opinion gave further particulars concerning
the substantial evidence rule. The proceedings in the district court
were to be considered as a whole in deciding whether or not substantial evidence reasonably supported the action of the Commission. The evidence on one side was not to be considered to the
exclusion of that introduced by the opposing side. The district
court did not have to give weight to incredible, perjured or unreasonable testimony, and a scintilla of evidence was insufficient to
satisfy the rule. All competent evidence was admissible in the
trial, not being limited to that offered before the Commission. The
contesting parties had full rights of cross-examination and impeachment.
The merits of the case involved a settlement of conflicting property rights. The final judgment was that substantial evidence on
the whole record made in the district court reasonably supported
the Commission in making an exception to Rule 37 in order to
prevent waste and confiscation of property.
Thomas v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.' was a case in which the
district court cancelled a permit granted by the Railroad Commission to drill a second well on a tract of land as an exception to
Rule 37. The civil appeals court affirmed, but the supreme court
reversed on the ground that substantial evidence in the district
court (the testimony of one witness) reasonably supported the
9 145 Tex. 270, 198 S. W. 2d 420 (1946). Justice Hickman wrote the opinion of
the court. Chief Justice Alexander dissented.
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order of the Commission. The Thomas decision includes the following significant statement:
"... [T] rial courts and courts of civil appeal are clothed with authority, not possessed by this court, to set aside ... findings if they are
thought to be against the great weight and overwhelming preponderance of the evidence. But those courts are not clothed with authority
to set aside fact findings of an administrative agency made within
the scope of its statutory powers on that ground. The Legislature has
clothed administrative agencies with special powers to perform special functions and in reviewing fact findings of such agencies no ques.
tion of the preponderance of evidence is involved. The question is
whether or not there is any substantial evidence affording reasonable
support for such findings and the orders entered thereunder. That is
a question of law of which this court, along with the lower courts,
has jurisdiction....
In Hawkins v. Texas Co.11 the trial court cancelled a permit to
drill a tenth oil well on a tract, which had been granted as an
exception to Rule 37. The judgment was affirmed by the court of
civil appeals and the supreme court because no substantial evidence supported the Commission's order. The only supporting
evidence was testimony espousing the "more wells, more oil"
theory of drilling. This theory had been rejected in earlier cases
as creating an exception which would destroy Rule 37. To sustain
an exception under the Rule, coming within the standard "to prevent waste or confiscation," an applicant had to show special circumstances affecting his tract not common to adjacent tracts in
the field. The court reiterated that the district court is to determine "from all the evidence before it, the entire record, whether
the Commission's action is or is not reasonably supported by substantial evidence," that scrutiny of the evidence is not to be limited
to one side alone, and that the trial is not on the preponderance
of evidence.
The Trapp, Thomas and Hawkins cases are not entirely clear
'lId.at 273, 198 S. W. 2d at 421. Italics added.
11146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. 2d 338 (1948).
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on the question whether the district court may pass upon the
credibility of witnesses. It is to be doubted that the court may do
so. The statement that incredible, perjured or unreasonable testimony may be rejected probably refers to evidence which is clearly
unworthy of any consideration. If the district court may pass upon
credibility of witnesses in the sense of weighing testimony, it
would be substituting its judgment for that of the Railroad Commission, and the trial would be on the preponderance of evidence,
something expressly negatived by the Texas Supreme Court. 2
The late Chief Justice Alexander wrote a powerful dissent in
the Trapp case, repeating views expressed by him for a unanimous
court in the Trem Carr and Marrs cases." He felt that the latter
cases were more binding than the Gulf-Atlantic decision and established that an independent trial of facts and law should be had
under Article 6049c, Section 8. The "right to file a suit" could
only mean a trial in which evidence and testimony are weighed
and a judgment reached on the merits. The sentence putting the
burden of proof on the complaining party was appropriate only
on a construction of the statute allowing an independent trial on
the preponderance of evidence. An unwise rule was being adopted
because it would be an administrative agency with poor resources
that could not arrange for some substantial evidence to support
its action.
The Chief Justice cited the well-known Crowell and Ben Avon
Borough cases14 as requiring, under the Federal Constitution, an
independent trial of the facts and law where the issue of confiscation is raised. While these cases have not been overruled, their
12 But see Texas Liquor Control Board v. Saiz, 220 S. W. 2d 502, 510 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949) ("As has been stated, the duty of judging the credibility of witnesses is
still incumbent on the district judge, even though he may be circumscribed by the
substantial evidence rule.") ; State v. Peeler, 200 S. W. 2d 874, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947) ("The findings of fact by the county judge is [sic) not binding on the district
judge unless the district court believes them to be true....").
13 Cited supra note 7.
14 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920). St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38
(1936), could also have been cited. Cf. Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426 (1936).
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authority has been seriously weakened by later decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.15 Calling confiscation a constitutional fact which must be tried independently in court leads to
difficulties in that virtually all orders of important administrative
agencies affect property rights and can be claimed to result in confiscation.

3.

EXTENT OF APPLICATION OF RULE

Recent Decisions. While the substantial evidence rule was developed primarily in cases involving orders of the Railroad Commission in the oil and gas industry, its reason and policy extend to
other agencies and industries. Several cases decided since the
Trapp decision support this proposition. The wording of the
statutes construed is of great importance.
In Fire Department v. City of Fort Worth 6 suit was brought to
have declared unconstitutional a statute 17 establishing a civil service system for policemen and firemen in cities of over 10,000 population. Section 18 of the act provided that a fireman or policeman
dissatisfied with a disciplinary order could file a petition in the district court "asking that his order of suspension or dismissal be set
aside ...[and] that he be reinstated"; such case was to "be tried
de novo." The section was held unconstitutional by the court of
civil appeals on the ground that it imposed upon the district court
administrative, as distinguished from judicial, functions. The supreme court reversed, noting that the civil service commission was
restricted in the causes for discipline and describing the district
court's function as follows:
"The extent of such review has been rather generally held to be limited to an ascertainment of whether there was substantial evidence
reasonably sufficient to support the challenged order.... There is
15 New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284 (1947); Railroad Comm. v. Rowan
and Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940), 311 U. S. 614 (1941); id., 311 U. S. 570
(1941).
16147 Tex. 505, 217 S. W. 2d 664 (1949), rev'g 213 S. W. 2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.

1948).
17

Tax. REv. CIv.

STAT. (Vernon,

1948) art. 1269m, §§ 1-28.
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nothing in Section 18 to suggest that the district court is empowered
to do more. Although the statute provides for a trial de novo, this
term as applied to reviews of administrative orders has come to have
a well-defined significance in the decisions of this state, and as a rule
has been taken to mean a trial to determine only the issues of whether
the agency's ruling is free of the taint of any illegality and is reasonably supported by substantial evidence." '

The court went on to explain that the district court's action under
the substantial evidence rule was limited to sustaining or vacating
the commission's order; the district court could not exercise administrative powers by substituting its discretion for that of the commission.
In Jones v. Marsh9 an application for a retail license to sell
beer had been denied by a county judge acting as an administrative tribunal in enforcing the state liquor laws. Appeal was taken
to the district court under a statute providing that "the trial shall
be de novo under the same rules as ordinary civil suits." 2 The
district court applied the substantial evidence rule and upheld the
county judge. The judgment was affirmed by the court of civil
appeals and by the Texas Supreme Court.
The remarkable feature of the case was that the statute could
hardly have prescribed in plainer terms an independent trial of
the facts and law in the district court. "Trial de novo" is the apt
term for such a trial, and it was reinforced by the statement that
the proceedings should be "under the same rules as ordinary civil
suits." Yet the substantial ,evidence rule was held applicable.
The court explained its holding as follows:
"... The statute does not expressly provide that there shall be in
district court a full retrial of the facts as if there had been no findings made by the county judge, nor does the statute specify what issue
or issues shall be tried in the district court. It may, therefore, reasonably be concluded, in view of the subject matter involved and the
147 Tex. at 510, 217 S. W. 2d at 666.
19 148 Tex. 362, 224 S. W. 2d 198 (1949), aff'g 223 S. W. 2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
20 TEX. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) arts. 666-14, 667-6.
is
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nature of the order to be reviewed, that only a limited review is
intended, and that in so far as the facts which are the basis for the
order of the county judge are concerned the question or issue to be
determined in the district court is whether or not the findings of the
county judge are reasonably supported by substantial evidence. Such
a trial is one kind of a trial de novo, and the somewhat limited trial
can be held, as the' '2 statute requires, under the rules applicable to
ordinary civil suits. 1

The court went on to say that the license in question was a mere
privilege and that in the interest of efficiency the fact findings of
the administrative agency in this type of proceeding "are usually
subject to a limited, rather than to a full, judicial review.... -22
The substantial evidence rule was restated as applying to the evidence introduced in the trial court and as requiring the trial and
appellate courts "to determine as a matter of law the reasonableness of the support afforded by substantial evidence... [taking]
into consideration all the evidence. ' 23 The Jones case settled the
question of application of the substantial evidence rule under the
liquor control law, a point on which conflict had arisen in the
courts of civil appeal.24
Department of Public Safety v. Robertson" involved a refusal
to issue a driver's license on the ground of defective vision. Robertson filed a petition for hearing in a county court under a statute
which directed the court "to take testimony and examine into the
facts of the case" and to "determine whether petitioner is entitled
to a license." 26 A proviso stated that "the trial.., shall be a trial
de novo and the licensee shall have the right of trial by jury." The
21

148 Tex. at 367, 224 S. W. 2d at 201.

22

Ibid.
Id. at 369, 224 S. W. 2d at 202.

28

24 In accord with the Jones case: Corder v. Delgado, 234 S. W. 2d 268 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950); Ex parte Graham, 226 S. W. 2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Ex parte
Velasco, 225 S. W. 2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Ramos v. Austin, 220 S. W. 2d 528
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Carson v. State, 216 S. W. 2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949);
State v. Peeler, 200 S. W. 2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Contra: Texas Liquor Control Board v. Saiz, 220 S. W. 2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
25 203 S. W. 2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
28 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6687b, § 31.
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county court held an independent trial and ordered the issuance
of a license. The judgment was reversed because the substantial
evidence rule should have been applied and would have resulted
in sustaining the Department of Public Safety. The court commented that the license sought was not a property right but a mere
privilege and that the Department was vested with wide discretion.
Consolidated Chemical Industries v. Railroad Comnmission 7 was
a case in which plaintiff common carrier sued to set aside an order
allowing a competitor to lower its rate on sulphuric acid. Suit was
brought under a statute2" permitting any party dissatisfied with
any rate or order to file a petition in the district court of Travis
County setting forth objections. The suit was to "be tried and determined as other civil causes in said court." The order of the Railroad Commission was sustained in the district and civil appeals
courts on an application of the substantial evidence rule. While
the statute was not as explicit as in the Robertson and Jones cases,
it still appeared to allow an independent trial of the facts and law.
Several cases involving grant or revocation of certificates of
convenience and necessity have reached the appellate courts. For
example, in Kerrville Bus Company v. Continental Bus System29
and in Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Commission"
suits were brought to set aside grants of certificates. A statute permitted filing of a petition in the district court and declared that
"said action ...shall be tried and determined as other civil causes
in said court."" l The burden of proof was placed on petitioner
"to show by a preponderance of evidence" that the orders complained of were unreasonable or unjust. In both cases the substantial evidence rule was applied, and petitioners were denied relief.
Other decisions have applied the rule under the same or similar
statutes.82
27 201 S. W. 2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e.
28 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6453.

29 208 S. W. 2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e.
30 208 S. W. 2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e.
31 Trx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 911a, § 17.
32 Stotts v. Railroad Commission, 236 S. W. 2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

In Board of Firemen's Relief v. Marks3" the Firemen's Pension
Commissioner of Houston had denied plaintiff's claim for a total
disability pension. The pertinent statute merely allowed "an appeal" to the district court of Travis County. 4 The district court
set aside the decision*of the Commissioner on the ground that it
was not reasonably supported by substantial evidence, and this
judgment was affirmed. The court of civil appeals assumed throughout its opinion that the substantial evidence rule was the proper
measure of judicial review.
Recent instances may be cited where resort has been permitted
to the district court under the substantial evidence rule although
the legislation governing the challenged administrative body did
not mention the right of appeal. In City of Amarillo v. Hancock85
plaintiff was demoted from captain to driver in the Amarillo Fire
Department on complaint of negligence by the Fire Chief. The district court vacated the demotion order of the civil service commission because it was not reasonably supported by substantial evidence. The statute governing discipline of employees in the Fire
Department did not provide for appeal from demotions.3" Nevertheless, it was held "well-settled by the decisions that, even without express statutory authority, the orders entered by an administrative
body, such as the Civil Service Commission of the City of Amarillo,
are subject to judicial review." 7

Patillo v. County School Trustees of Wilson County"8 involved
a different type of administrative agency but came to the same
(cancellation of certificates under TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 911b, §
12(b)); Wattenburger v. Railroad Commission, 231 S. W. 2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950) er. rel. n.r.e. (cancellation of certificate under TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon,
1948) art. 911b, § 20) ; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 213 S. W. 2d 99
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e. (grant of specialized motor carrier certificate).
33 237 S. W. 2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. granted.
34 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6243e, § 18.
85 233 S. W. 2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) er. granted.
86 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1269m, §§ 18, 19.
11233 S. W. 2d at 341. Acc., White v. Bolner, 223 S. W. 2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949) er. ref. (ouster by mayor of commissioners of housing authority under TEx. REV.

CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1269k, § 7; no mention of appeal in statute).
38 235 S. W. 2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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conclusion. Defendant board of trustees denied a petition to detach

certain territory from one district and to annex it to another, and
a suit was brought to have the refusal declared an abuse of discretion. No provision for appeal was to be found in the statutes,"9
but the court said, "In determining whether an action of an administrative agency such as a county board of school trustees is a
valid exercise of a discretionary power or an arbitrary action the
courts will generally apply the 'substantial evidence' rule."4

The Statutes. The decisions indicate that the substantial evidence
rule is to be applied wherever an appeals statute seems to allow
a full judicial trial. One may well ask, how common are such
statutes in Texas? The answer is that the Texas Legislature has

repeatedly enacted statutes of this type.
Examination of the statute books reveals that by far the most
common mode of appeal from administrative agencies in Texas
is by suit in a district or (much less commonly) county court. The
language varies, but some patterns may be noted. A great number
' Almost as large a
of the statutes provide for a "trial de novo." 41
group provide for an action like that of "an ordinary civil suit"
or with rules as in "other civil suits."4 2 Some of the statutes com89

TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 2742f, § 1.

40 235 S. W. 2d at 925.
41 TEX. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) arts. 614-1 (a) (Commissioner of Labor Statistics, regulation of boxing and wrestling, licenses) ; 734b, § 16 (Board of Hairdressers and Cosmetologists, regulation of beauty schools and operators). TEX. REv. Civ.

STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 1269m, § 18 (civil service commission, dismissal of employee) ; 1524a, § 7 (Banking Commissioner, disapproval of securities) ; 1524h (municipal governing body, rents, charges, operations of housing corporation); 2372g-1,
§ 2 (commissioners court, awards to injured employees) ; 4582a, § 4 (State Board of
Embalming and State Board of Health, funeral directors' licenses) ; 4859f, § 3 (Board
of Insurance Commissioners, regulation of mutual assessment life insurance

com-

panies) ; 4764c, § 12 (Tex. Acts 1949, c. 81) (same, regulation of credit, life, health,
accident insurance) ; 4860a-20, § 2a(t) (same, regulation of county mutual insurance
companies) ; 5062b, § 18 (same, recording agents' and solicitors' licenses) ; 5221b-4
(amended, Tex. Acts 1949, c. 148) (Unemployment Compensation Commission) ; 5274
(Board of Examiners of State Land Surveyors, licenses) ; 6674s, §§ 11, 16 (Industrial
Accident Board, workmen's compensation insurance for highway employees) ; 6687b,
§ 31 (Department

of Public Safety, drivers' licenses); 7628

(commissioners court,

organization of water improvement district) ; 7819 (same, water control and preservation
districts) ; 7979 (same, organization of levee improvement districts) ; 8307, § 5 (Industrial Accident Board, Workm~n's Compensation Act).
42 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon,

1948) arts. 135a-1, § 5 (Commissioner of Agricul-
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bine these expressions.4" Many of the statutes are less explicit and
authorize a petition or suit to try the issue decided by the administrative agency." The inference would seem to be justified that
an independent trial was contemplated. Another large group of
statutes allow an "appeal" or "review" or "redress" in the district
or county court and fail to supply further details.46 Frequently the
ture, quarantine of areas for insect pests and plant diseases); 911a, § 17 (Railroad
Commission, regulation of motor bus transportation) ; 911b, § 20 (same, regulation of
motor carriers) ; 911d, § 14 (same, regulation of motor bus ticket brokers, licenses) ;
3271a, § 22 (Board of Registration for Professional Engineers, certificates); 4549
(Board of Dental Examiners, licenses); 4893 (Board of Insurance Commissioners.
rates and forms of insurance policies); 5068b, § 4 (same, agents' licenses) ; 5180
(Commissioner of Labor Statistics, correction of industrial conditions) ; 6049a, § 12
(Railroad Commission, regulation of pipe lines) ; 6059 (same, regulation of gas utilities) ; 6453 (same, regulation of railroads) ; 7530, 7564, 7567, 7590 (Board of Water
Engineers, rates, orders and regulations) ; 7880-18, -21 (commissioners court or Board
of Water Engineers, organization of water control and improvement districts).
41 TEx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) arts. 614-17(c) (Commissioner of Labor Statistics, regulation of boxing and wrestling, licenses) ; 666-14 (Liquor Control Board
and Administrator, licenses) ; 667-6 (same) ; 667-22 (same) ; 752c, § 5 (Board of
Dental Examiners, licenses). TEX. REy. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 46e-11
(Board of Adjustment or zoning board, zoning regulations) ; 5221a-6, § 7 (Tex. Acts
1949, c. 245) (Commissioner of Labor Statistics, licenses of private employment
agents) ; 6053, §§ 15, 16 (Railroad Commission, licenses); 7065b-16 (Comptroller,
fuel dealers' licenses).
44 TEx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) arts. 734a, §§ 9, 22-A (Board of Barber Examiners, regulation of barbers and barbers' colleges, licenses); 881b, § 8 (Game, Fish
and Oyster Commissioner, regulations) ; 1525a, § 11 (Live Stock Sanitary Commission, dipping of sheep and cattle, injunction) ; 1525c, § 23 (same, tick eradication).
Tax. Ray. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 600a, §§ 8, 24, 28 (Secretary of State, regulation of securities, dealers' licenses) ; 881a-3 (Banking Commissioner, regulation of
building and loan associations, mandamus) ; 1105b, §§ 9, 14 (assessments for improvements) ; 1302a, § 20 (Board of Insurance Commissioners, certificate of authority to
do business) ; 2922-19 (Tex. Acts 1949, c. 334, art. IX) (Gilmer-Akin Law) (Central
Education Agency, actions and orders) ; 4512b, § 14 (Tex. Acts 1949, c. 94) (Board of
Chiropractic Examiners, licenses) ; 4573 (Board of Chiropody Examiners, licenses);
4698a, § 11 (Board of Insurance Commissioners, regulation of casualty, fidelity and
guaranty insurance) ; 4750 (same, approval of insurance policy forms) ; 4775 (same,
revocation of certificate to do business) ; 5221a-5, § 5 (Tex. Acts 1949, c. 234) (Commissioner of Labor Statistics, licensing of labor agencies) ; 5421c, § 6(j) (Commissioner of General Land Office, action on application for lease or purchase) ; 6008, § 24
(Railroad Commission, regulation of production of natural gas) ; 6008a, § 6 (same,
sour gas) ; 6049c, § 8 (same, oil and gas conservation).
45 Tx. RaY. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 118a, § 4 (Commissioner of Agriculture, regulation of packing of citrus fruits) ; 118b, §§ 6, 8, 14 (same, citrus fruit dealers' licenses) ; 118c-1, § 8 (same, standardization of tomatoes) ; 118c-2, § 8 (same, standardization of cabbages) ; 118d, § 8 (Tex. Acts 1949, c. 93) (Citrus Commission, regulation of citrus fruit industry) ; 124 (same, abatement of diseased trees and plants) ;
135a-2, § 4 (same, eradication of Mexican fruit fly) ; 1287-1, § 6 (same, licensing of
dealers in agricultural products) ; 2686 (county board of school trustees) ; 2740b, § 10
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statutes say that the action of the administrative agency is prima
facie valid or that a presumption exists in favor of the correctness
of the action.4" A scattering of statutes expressly allow a jury
trial47 or deny it.4 Appeal is not mentioned in some of the statutes,49 and in one it is expressly denied.50 Two statutes combine
a writ of certiorari with an independent trial in the district court. 51
4
(county board of education; territorial changes in school districts) ; 27 2c, § 9 (same) ;
2815f (same) ; 4429 (commissioners court, removal of county health officer); 4432
4
(same as to city health officer) ; 45 2a, § 12 (State Board of Pharmacy, licenses) ; 4573
(Board of Examiners in Optometry, licenses) ; 4590c, § 9 (Tex. Acts 1949, c. 95)
(Board of Examiners in the Basic Sciences, certificates and licenses) ; 4682b, § 10
(Board of Insurance Commissioners, automobile insurance, classification of risks and
rates) ; 4698a, § 11 (same, casualty, fidelity and guaranty insurance, licenses) ; 4764b,
§ 6 (same, form of industrial insurance policies) ; 4856 (same, revocation of license
of authority to do business) ; 4912 (same, clasto do business) ; 4901 (same, certificate
6
sification, rates, policy form) ; 50 2a, § 13 (same, recording agents' and solicitors'
licenses); 5421c, § 6(f) (Commissioner of General Land Office, estimate of cost of
application for lease or purchase of land) ; 5702 (Governor or commissioners court,
removal of public weigher) ; 6066a, § 9 (Railroad Commission, rejection of tender or
manifest) ; 6243e, § 18 (Firemen's Pension Commissioner) ; 6782 (commissioners
court, assessment for drainage) ; 6899-1, § 5 (Department of Public Safety, registration of tattoo marks for animals, protests) ; 8268 (Board of Commissioners of Pilots,
disputes as to pilotage).
46 TEx. PFN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) art. 881b, § 8. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon,
1948) arts. 911a, § 17; 911b, § 20; 911d, § 14; 3271a, § 22; 4512b, § 14 (Tex. Acts
1949, c. 94) ; 4573; 5180; 5221a-4, § 5 (Tex. Acts 1949, c. 234) ; 6049c, § 8; 6059; 6454;
6783; 6674s, § 11; 7568; 8307, § 5.
47 Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 4549 (jury may be waived); 6687b,

§ 31.

48 TEX. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) arts. 666-14, 667-6, 667-22. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
(Vernon, 1948) art. 7880-18.
49 TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 695c (State Department, Public Welfare Act) ; 2884 (State Board of Education, cancellation of teacher's certificate);
5221 c (Commissioner of Labor Statistics, repair of steam boilers) ; 6243-101 (Board
of Plumbing Examiners, licenses).
5o TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 4580 (Board of Embalming and State
Board of Health, licenses).
51 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 46e-11 (Board of Adjustment or
zoning board, zoning orders) ; 1011g (same).
Concerning the latter statute the Texas Supreme Court has said in Board of Adjustment of City of Fort Worth v. Stovall, 147 Tex. 366, 369, 216 S. W. 2d 171, 172 (1949) :
"However, the review authorized by Art. 1011g, although designated by a different name and involving somewhat different procedure, is not essentially different
in nature from the review contemplated by the other statutes we have referred to....
[T]he review by certiorari under Art. 1011g is broader than tnder the common-law
certiorari, but the court does not undertake to substitute its discretion for that of
the board, and merely determines whether on the whole record the board abused
its discretion."
Thus, the substantial evidence rule or a rule similar to it is applicable under the
statute.
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The likelihood is that the substantial evidence rule will be
engrafted upon the bulk of these statutes. Undoubtedly in some
instances this will not be true. 2 It is hard to believe that the independent trial under the Workmen's Compensation Law58 will be
changed. And the case of Lone Star Gas Co. v. State"' still stands
as allowing an independent trial of facts and law where a rate is
established by the Railroad Commission for a public utility.
4.

SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL

The Texas legal climate has not been unusually congenial to
administrative agencies. A considerable body of opinion exists
that administrative agencies should be subject to close judicial
supervision. Hence one may wonder why the Texas Supreme Court
adopted the substantial evidence rule when the statutes invited,
if they did not direct, a construction allowing independent court

trials.
The main explanation probably is stated in the Gulf-Atlantic

decision. Administrative agencies are established by the Legislature as expert bodies exercising wise discretion in complex fields.
Most of the value of the administrative process would be lost if
agency determinations were subject to substitution by court judgments on the same evidence. Uniformity of treatment of the sub-

ject of regulation is vital, and independent court trials would tend
to destroy it.
The-Texas Legislature may unwittingly have contributed to the

development of the substantial evidence rule. In providing for
52 In State Board of Ins. Commrs. of Texas v. Fulton, 229 S. W. 2d 652 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950) er. rel. n.r.e., the license of plaintiff insurance agency was suspended for
cause for 30 days. TEX. Rov. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5062b, § 18, provides that
appeals to the district court "shall be by a trial de novo, as such term is commonly
used and intended in an appeal from justice court to county court." The court of civil
appeals declared that this language called for an independent trial of the facts and
law and not for application of the substantial evidence rule.
53 TEx. Rav. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 5.
54 137 Tex. 279, 153 S. W. 2d 681 (1941), construing TEx. Ray. Clv. STAT. (Vernon,
1948) art. 6059 (trial as in "other civil causes"; burden of proof on plaintiff to show
"by clear and convincing evidence" that rates are unreasonable, unjust or confiscatory).
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trials "de novo" or for actions like "ordinary civil suits" the Legislature seems to have made its intent clear: to afford an independent judicial trial of the issues determined by the administrative
agency. But indiscriminate allowance of such trials may well cause
the courts to take measures in self-defense to lessen the load of
litigation. The oil and gas cases involve such valuable interests
that few administrative orders would not be made the subject of
petitions for trial de novo. The same may be said, in less degree,
with respect to other administrative determinations. One might
expect the courts to develop some sort of doctrine which would
make a determination reasonably secure where an expert agency
has exercised its sound discretion after a fair hearing. The substantial evidence rule undoubtedly operates to cause some litigation to end in the administrative agency because of the small prospect of reversal.
If it is deemed imperative that a court try anew and independently the issues determined by an administrative agency, the remedy for the substantial evidence rule is explicit amendment of the
many statutes which presently are susceptible to interpretation
bringing the rule into operation. It is to be noted that the Fiftyfirst Legislature repudiated the substantial evidence rule in two
enactments. 5 The rule was expressly adopted, however, in another
statute. 6
It would seem to be a self-frustrating measure to provide invariably for independent court trials of administrative determinations.
Such a measure would relegate the administrative process to an
insignificant role in government, out of keeping with its value and
55 Tix. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 6573a, § 15 (Tex. Acts 1949, c. 149)
(Real Estate Commission, licenses) ; 7880-3c, § F (Tex. Acts 1949, c. 306) (Board
of Water Engineers, underground water conservation districts). The former statute
declares:
"The case shall be tried in the District Court de novo, upon its merits, and it
shall take a preponderance of evidence offered before said District Court for the
court to enter a judgment. The substantial evidence rule shall not be used, and the
right of trial by jury shall be had in all cases when called for."
56 Trx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8197f note (Tex. Acts 1949, c.
110) (Board of Water Engineers, rates for electric energy from the Sabine River
Authority).
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usefulness. Many more courts would be needed to handle the
volume of trial work coming from the administrative agencies.
If administrative determinations are not to be re-tried independently in the courts, what is to be said concerning the Texas substantial evidence rule? A fundamental criticism is that it is cumbersome. A full trial is allowed, all relevant and competent evidence is admitted, but the purpose is a narrow one: to decide
whether or not substantial evidence reasonably supports an administrative determination. Would not the same purpose be achieved
more efficiently, less expensively and just as fairly by judicial
review of the record of the administrative agency and dispensing
with the trial? This, of course, is the federal substantial evidence
rule, as modified by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
Two subsidiary criticisms may be made. The Texas substantial
evidence rule does not compel the parties to present all their evidence to the administrative agency; they can hold back and introduce new evidence in the trial court. This situation is obviously
undesirable. The parties should be constrained to make available
all evidence and arguments which will enable the administrative
tribunal to come to a correct conclusion. Also, the rule apparently
compels affirmance of an administrative determination where substantial evidence reasonably supports it even though the agency
has committed errors in its proceedings.57 The trial court may not
send the case back for a second exercise of fair judgment on the
basis of corrected proceedings. The review is inflexible in that
the administrative order must be affirmed or annulled.
An argument may be made that the Texas substantial evidence
rule adds a real safeguard without impairing the administrative
process. Oral presentation in court may bring out facts and circumstances rendering an agency's order without reasonable support by substantial evidence where this could not be done in an
57 E. g., Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Comm., 208 S. W. 2d 593 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e. (order sustained although the Railroad Commission gave
an erroneous reason for overruling an objection to the grant of a certificate of convenience and necessity).
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appeal on the basis of an impersonal printed record. But it is
probably a rare case in which an administrative order could and
should be reversed under the Texas rule and in which the same
result would not be reached on a simple review of the record aided
by briefs and arguments of the parties. If this latter estimate is
correct, then the Texas substantial evidence rule must be regarded
as a tool for judicial review of administrative orders which is
distinctive and is to be preferred, as a matter of policy, over a
new, independent trial; but which has no special merit or advantage when compared with the present federal substantial evidence rule.

